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Abstract 
Following recent evidence for a link between interoception, emotion and empathy, we 
investigated relationships between these factors in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). 26 
adults with ASD and 26 healthy participants completed tasks measuring interoception, 
alexithymia and empathy. ASD participants with alexithymia demonstrated lower cognitive 
and affective empathy than ASD participants without alexithymia. ASD participants showed 
reduced interoceptive sensitivity (IS), and also reduced interoceptive awareness (IA). IA was 
correlated with empathy and alexithymia, but IS was related to neither. Alexithymia fulfilled 
a mediating role between IA and empathy. Our findings are suggestive of an alexithymic 
subgroup in ASD, with distinct interoceptive processing abilities, and have implications for 
diagnosis and interventions. 
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The feeling of me feeling for you: 
Interoception, alexithymia and empathy in autism 
Introduction 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder that is characterised by social 
and communication impairments, restrictive and repetitive behaviours (DSM-5, American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). One of the main characteristics of ASD is an impairment in 
reciprocal social behaviour. An important psychological explanation that may partly explain 
this deficit is that it arises from a limited understanding of others’ points of view, thoughts, 
intentions and beliefs, and is known in the literature as a deficit in ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM). 
The understanding of others’ emotions is also affected, with studies showing reduced 
empathy in ASD (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). 
However, in recent years it has been recognised that empathy is a multifaceted process with 
an affective component and a cognitive component, where a feeling of sharing the emotion of 
another (affective empathy) may arise from the apprehension or comprehension of another’s 
emotional state (cognitive empathy) (Bird & Viding, 2014; Eisenberg, 2000) as well as from 
bottom-up processes that result in the vicarious experience of an emotion observed in 
another, through mirroring mechanisms (Bird & Viding, 2014; Keysers & Gazzola, 2009). 
Several studies have shown that cognitive empathy, which involves inferring the emotion of 
others, may be reduced in ASD (e.g. Demurie, de Corel & Roeyers, 2011; Golan & Baron-
Cohen, 2006), whereas affective empathy (the ability to share the emotion of others) may not 
be adversely affected (Dziobek et al., 2008; Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf, & Convit, 
2007; Rueda, Fernández-Berrocal, & Baron-Cohen, 2015).  
Given growing evidence for important links between the detection of internal bodily 
states (interoception), emotion processing, and empathy  (Craig, 2002; Damasio, 2000; 
Grynberg & Pollatos, 2015; Herbert, Pollatos, & Schandry, 2007; Terasawa, Moriguchi, 
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Tochizawa, & Umeda, 2014), the present study will investigate relationships between these 
factors in participants with ASD. 
 Interoception - the sense of the physiological state of the body (Craig, 2002) – has 
been proposed to play an important role in emotion processing (Craig, 2002; Damasio, 2000; 
James, 1894), and may also play a part in the process of empathy. There is some evidence 
that people who are more sensitive to their bodily (interoceptive) sensations tend to have a 
better understanding of their emotions  (Critchley, 2005; Herbert, Herbert, & Pollatos, 2011), 
and experience emotions more intensely (Herbert et al., 2007; Wiens, Mezzacappa, & Katkin, 
2000). Interoceptive sensitivity (IS) is usually objectively measured by tasks that assess the 
accuracy with which one detects one’s heartbeat (Cameron, 2001; Schandry, 1981; 
Whitehead, Drescher, Heiman, & Blackwell, 1977). Alternatively, subjective interoceptive 
awareness (sometimes called interoceptive sensibility – see Garfinkel et al., 2015) may be 
measured with questionnaires (e.g. Mehling et al., 2012; Porgess, 1993).  Lastly, meta-
cognitive measures of interoceptive awareness, quantifying the discrepancy between 
subjective awareness and objective sensitivity, have also been used (Garfinkel et al., 2015). 
Studies have found a relationship between IS and cognitive and affective empathy for pain 
(Singer et al., 2004), and a cortical index of interoception - the heartbeat evoked potential – 
has been associated with empathic concern  (Fukushima, Terasawa, & Umeda, 2011). 
Furthermore, neuroimaging studies show that the primary brain region involved in 
interoception - the insula - is also activated during the subjective awareness of emotional 
feelings, including anger, disgust, pain, and empathy (Craig, 2008; Ochsner et al., 2008; 
Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009; Zaki, Davis, & Ochsner, 2012), and insula activation 
during empathy tasks can be increased by enhancing interoceptive awareness beforehand 
(Ernst, Northoff, Bäker, Seifritz, & Grimm, 2012).  
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These studies suggest that interoceptive brain areas are recruited both during 
emotional and empathy processes. Moreover, similar brain activity occurs when experiencing 
emotions and observing others’ emotions (Botvinick et al., 2005; Jabbi, Bastiaansen, & 
Keysers, 2008; Wicker et al., 2003). Additionally, learned associations between interoceptive 
signals and emotions observed in others may contribute to empathy (Bird & Viding, 2014; 
Quatrocki & Friston, 2014). Bird and Viding (2014) have proposed the Self to Other Model 
of Empathy (SOME) in which interoceptive cues and the representation of these in emotions, 
together with a situation understanding system and ToM, provide the basis for empathy when 
the experience of emotion is recognised as being elicited by the emotions of others. Having 
an internal representation of one’s own emotions is an integral part of this empathy model. 
In this light, it is important to note that ASD is a disorder that co-occurs with 
alexithymia (Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004), a condition characterised by a reduced ability to 
recognise, describe and understand one’s own emotions (Nemiah, Freyberger, & Sifneos, 
1976). Alexithymia is considered to be a trait that is prevalent in around 10% of the general 
population (Linden, Wen, & Paulhus, 1995), but prevalent in ~50% of the ASD population 
(Hill et al., 2004; Samson, Huber, & Gross, 2012). Indeed, the high prevalence of alexithymia 
in the autistic population may explain mixed results in emotion research, as results sometimes 
differ depending on the proportion of ASD participants in any particular sample who have 
co-occurring alexithymia  (Bird & Cook, 2013; Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013; Shah, 
Catmur & Bird, 2016; Shah, Hall, Catmur & Bird, 2016). Differences in the recognition of 
facial expressions have been related to alexithymia, not autism (Cook et al., 2013; Grynberg 
et al., 2012), and differences in insula activation during empathy tasks between people with 
and without ASD were not significant after accounting for alexithymia (Bird et al., 2010; 
Silani et al., 2008). Given these results, it is very important to take alexithymia levels into 
account when investigating empathy and other traits in ASD.  
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There are early indications that interoceptive processing in people with ASD is 
altered.  Sensory processing differences in ASD are well known and studies have reported 
relative indifference or hyposensitivity to interoceptive sensations like pain, temperature, 
hunger, and thirst in both adults and children with ASD  (Ben-Sasson et al., 2009; Crane, 
Goddard, & Pring, 2009; Elwin, Ek, Kjellin, & Schröder, 2013), although there are some 
indications of increased sensitivity to pain  (Fan, Chen, Chen, Decety, & Cheng, 2014).  
So far, only five quantitative studies have specifically investigated interoception in 
ASD, and these have reported mixed results, albeit with an overall trend towards reduced 
interoception (see review by DuBois, Ameis, Lai, Casanova, & Desarkar, 2016). Enhanced IS 
was found in a sample of children with ASD in trials that required them to count their own 
heartbeats for 100 seconds, while no difference was found in trials of shorter duration 
(Schauder, Mash, Bryant, & Cascio, 2014). On the other hand, reduced IS was found in a 
study with adults with ASD (Garfinkel, Tiley, O'Keeffe, Harrison, Seth, & Critchley, 2016). 
However, the latter study also reported higher scores on a self-report measure of awareness of 
bodily feelings. Interestingly, they found that the magnitude of discrepancy between the self-
report measure and IS was indicative of participants’ scores on the Cambridge Empathy 
Quotient. A third study reported reduced interoceptive awareness (measured by self-report) in 
adults with ASD (Fiene & Brownlow, 2015). Finally, two recent studies found that 
alexithymia, not severity of autistic traits, was associated with reduced IS in a typical sample 
and two samples that included individuals with ASD (Shah et al., 2016a; Shah et al., 2016b).  
Providing a possible explanation for the relationship between interoception and 
empathy, it has been suggested that the social difficulties of ASD arise from malfunctions in 
the ‘oxytocin-interoception system’ (Quattrocki & Friston, 2014), a system that influences 
the saliency of interoceptive signals, emotions, and the sense of self, from infancy. However, 
Brewer and colleagues have convincingly pointed out that alexithymia may be a consequence 
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of a compromised ‘oxytocin-interoception system’, not ASD (Brewer, Happé, Cook & Bird, 
2015). The latter is also in line with Bird and Viding’s empathy model, who propose that low 
empathy in autism is caused by impairments in the ToM and situation understanding parts of 
the SOME, whilst alexithymia may be the result of impairments in the affective 
representation system of the SOME (Bird & Viding, 2014).  
The present study aimed to further our knowledge of interoceptive processing in ASD 
by investigating the relations between interoception, alexithymia and empathy. Given 
research that shows alexithymia to be an explanatory factor of low levels of empathy in ASD 
(Bird & Cook, 2013), and following on from the suggestion that alexithymia may be a 
consequence of differences in the ‘oxytocin-interoception system’ (Brewer et al., 2013), and 
being theoretically supported by Bird and Viding’s theoretical model of empathy (Bird & 
Viding, 2014), we wanted to test if alexithymia could fulfil a mediating role in the 
relationship between interoception and empathy. Therefore, our hypothesis was that 
participants with ASD would have lower interoceptive awareness and IS, contributing to 
higher levels of alexithymia, and lower empathy. In addition, we predicted that the 
individuals with ASD who also have alexithymia would have lower levels of empathy than 
those without alexithymia.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Fifty-two participants (14 female) took part in the study, of which 26 (7 female) had 
previously received a diagnosis of high functioning autism or Asperger syndrome by a 
clinician independent from the current study. Participants were recruited via advertising, 
ASD support groups, autism charities and student populations. They received financial 
compensation for their time, or course credit for participation. A diagnosis of high 
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functioning autism or Asperger’s syndrome was accepted for inclusion in the ASD group. 
Twenty-three participants with ASD attended an Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule 
(ADOS) diagnostic interview (Lord et al., 2000) with a psychologist trained in the use of 
ADOS (one of the authors), to confirm their diagnosis of ASD. Nineteen participants met the 
diagnostic criteria for autism, and four met the criteria for autism spectrum disorder, 
according to ADOS guidelines. Written, informed consent was obtained from all participants 
and the study was approved by the local Faculty’s ethics panel. 
 All participants completed the Autism Quotient (AQ) questionnaire  (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001). ASD participants scored higher on the AQ, 
M (SD) = 31.1 (9.3), than control participants, M (SD)= 16.7 (6.4). The participants for whom 
we were unable to obtain ADOS diagnostic results for scored well above the screening cut-
off point of 32 on the AQ. The two groups were matched on sex (7 females in each group), 
on IQ (ASD group IQ M (SD) = 113.8 (12.0) and control group IQ M (SD) = 110.9 (13.5), t 
(50) = 0.83, p = .41) measured with the Wechsler Abbreviated Intelligence Scale, 2nd edition 
(Wechsler, 2011), and on age (ASD group age M (SD) = 25.9 (7.3), control group age M (SD) 
= 25.4 (7.6), t (50) = 0.15, p = .88). Five participants with ASD reported a diagnosis of co-
occurring anxiety or mood disorder. None of the members of the control group reported any 
mental disorders.  
 
Materials 
i. Alexithymia measure 
Participants completed the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & 
Taylor, 1994), which assesses alexithymia	  with statements such as “It is difficult for me to 
find the right words for my feelings”, and participants indicate their level of agreement on a 5 
point scale. The TAS-20 has 3 subscales: Difficulty Describing Feelings, Difficulty 
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Identifying Feeling, and Externally-Oriented Thinking. The TAS-20 has good reliability and 
validity (Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 2003). 
ii. Empathy measures 
Empathy was measured in two ways: by an empathy questionnaire designed to 
measure affective and cognitive empathy separately, and by a behavioural measure of 
affective empathy. The Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE; (Reniers, 
Corcoran, Drake, Shryane, & Völlm, 2011) collated 31 items for commonly used and 
validated empathy questionnaires that reflect cognitive empathy, defined as “the ability to 
construct a working model of the emotional states of others”, and affective empathy, defined 
as “the ability to be sensitive to and vicariously experience the feelings of others” (Reniers et 
al., 2011).  
 The English core version of the Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET; (Dziobek et al., 
2008) provided a behavioural measure of affective empathy. This version consists of 40 
images displaying an individual in an emotional state in a naturalistic environment, which 
were presented one by one on a 17” computer screen using E-prime 2.0 software (Psychology 
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Participants were asked to infer the emotion the person 
depicted is experiencing by choosing one of four words that best described the emotion 
displayed. The second task (measuring affective empathy) was to indicate on a scale of 1 to 9 
how much they empathized with the person depicted, with empathizing being defined as 
feeling the same emotion as the one the person on the screen is showing. The definition of 
empathizing was given at the start of the presentation of the relevant block of pictures, while 
the question appeared as a caption above each picture. The pictures were shown in random 
order in eight blocks of ten, and the blocks alternated between emotion recognition and 
empathizing. 
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iii. Interoception tasks 
We measured the accuracy with which participants perceived their heartbeat; this will 
be referred to as interoceptive sensitivity (IS). There are two widely used heartbeat 
perception tasks: One task measures the performance at heartbeat discrimination and the 
other at heartbeat tracking. At the time the present study was designed, no research into 
interoception and ASD had been published, and there is still no consensus in the field as to 
which is a better measure of interoception: both have their advantages and disadvantages and 
measure interoception in somewhat different ways (Knoll and Hoddap, 1992; Brener & Ring, 
2016). The tracking task requires internal monitoring of heartbeats over short intervals and is 
confounded by time estimation ability and beliefs about heart rates, whereas the 
discrimination task requires cross-sensory matching of the timing of internal and external 
events (for more on this see Discussion). Nevertheless, both tasks are widely regarded as 
measuring interoceptive ability (Garfinkel, et al., 2015) and so it is not inconceivable that 
they should be complementary in the present study. We could not predict, however, which of 
the two measures would be different in participants with autism and so we employed both.  
During the heartbeat tracking task (Schandry, 1981) the participant was seated 
upright, and was asked to count their own heartbeats and indicate how many heartbeats had 
occurred during a specific short time interval, whilst their heartbeat was recorded by an 
electrocardiogram (ECG). To this end, participants had three disposable surface electrodes 
with conductive hydrogel attached to their chest, and cardiac activity was relayed through 
shielded wires to the Powerlab Data Acquisition unit (AD Instruments, Germany). There 
were 4 trials of 25, 35, 45 and 55 seconds, presented in random order. Participants were 
asked not to take their pulse and they did not receive any feedback on their performance.  
 A second measure of IS - a version of the heartbeat discrimination task (Whitehead et 
al., 1977) - was also administered. During this task, ECG provided the input for in-house 
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developed ExpyVR software (http://lnco.epfl.ch/expyvr), which produced brief auditory 
tones triggered by the R-wave of the ECG in the synchronous condition, or it produced brief 
tones at a speed of either 80% or 120% of the frequency of the participant’s preceding two R-
waves to create the asynchronous condition. Participants were exposed to 20 tones per 
[synchronous or asynchronous] trial and indicated after each trial whether they thought the 
tones were in time with their heartbeat or not in time. Four synchronous trials and four 
asynchronous trials (two faster and two slower than the participant’s heartbeat) were 
administered in random order. The order of the two heartbeat tasks was counterbalanced 
across participants.  
 Interoceptive awareness (IA) was measured with the 32-item Multidimensional 
Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness questionnaire (MAIA - (Mehling et al., 2012), which 
assesses awareness of bodily sensations as a multi-dimensional construct, including elements 
of regulation and appraisal (Cameron, 2001). It contains statements like “When I am tense, I 
notice where the tension is located in my body” and participants indicate how often they 
experience this on a 5 point scale. The MAIA recognises that certain aspects of bodily 
awareness may be maladaptive; excessive focus on, worrying about or avoidance of bodily 
sensations are related to higher levels of anxiety, catastrophizing, and more difficulties with 
emotion regulation (Mehling et al, 2012). Items measuring worrying, avoidance and 
excessive focus have been reverse scored so that higher scores reflect mentally healthier 
levels of body awareness rather than more maladaptive awareness. The MAIA has 8 
subscales that reflect different dimensions of body awareness: Noticing, Distracting, 
Worrying, Attention Regulation, Emotional Awareness, Self-regulation, Body Listening, 
Trusting. 
Please note that what is called interoceptive awareness here, is equivalent to what 
other authors may call interoceptive sensibility (Garfinkel et al., 2015). These authors reserve 
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the term interoceptive awareness for meta-awareness of interoceptive sensitivity (a measure 
that quantifies how aware people are of their accuracy in detecting their own heartbeat), 
which was not measured here. 
 
Data Analysis 
Differences between groups were analysed with two-tailed independent t-tests (Controls vs. 
ASD participants) or with one-way Anovas (Controls/ASD non-alexithymia/ASD 
alexithymia). Spearman correlations were conducted between the relevant variables. The 
ASD group was split into participants with and without alexithymia, according to the high 
alexithymia cut-off score of 62  (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994), for the analyses 
investigating the effect of alexithymia on empathy.  
A 2 x 2 (empathy type x ASD status) mixed Anova, controlling for alexithymia as a 
covariant, and a 2 x 3 (empathy type x ASD-alexithymia status) mixed Anova were used to 
investigate differences between groups on the QCAE data. Post-hoc two-tailed t-tests were 
conducted, where appropriate, with the alpha-level adjusted to .017. 
One participant with ASD was excluded from the IS analyses due to not following 
instructions. For the heartbeat tracking task an accuracy score was calculated using the 
formula IS = {¼₁  Σ  [1 - (|recorded heartbeats – counted heartbeats|/recorded heartbeats)]}  as 
in Schandry, 1981. Accuracy scores of the heartbeat discrimination task were calculated as 
percentage correct.  
The MAIA questionnaire has 8 subscales and is not intended to provide a summated 
score of IA (Mehling et al., 2012). Multidimensional scaling of the MAIA responses were 
undertaken, using the PROXCAL algorithm in SPSS, in order to reduce the 8 dimensions of 
the MAIA and increase power. 
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Partial correlations were conducted where there was a significant relationship 
between the interoception measures, autistic traits (AQ scores) and alexithymia to establish 
the relative relationship of alexithymia and autistic traits with interoception. Where 
correlations were found between any of the interoception measures and alexithymia, and 
alexithymia and the empathy measures, a mediation analysis was conducted using PROCESS 
(Hayes, 2013) in SPSS, using a multiple regression approach. The relevant interoception 
measure was entered as predictor in a mediation model, alexithymia was entered as the 
mediator, and empathy as the outcome variable.  In a separate analysis, ASD status was 
entered as a moderating variable in the relationship between interoception and alexithymia. 
PROCESS uses confidence intervals generated by bootstrapping to produce inferential 
statistics (see Hayes, 2013 for more information). 95% confidence intervals that do not 
include zero indicate that the effect is likely a real effect (different from zero) and significant 
at the .05 alpha level.  
 
Results 
i. Alexithymia 
Only two individuals without ASD reached the high alexithymia cut-off point of 62 (Bagby, 
Parker, & Taylor, 1994), whereas 13 individuals from the ASD group (50%) had scores of 62 
or above. ASD participants scored significantly higher on alexithymia (M = 59.5, SD = 15.9) 
than control participants (M = 46.2, SD = 11.1) on the TAS-20 questionnaire, t (50) = 3.51, p 
= .001, d = 0.97. In further analyses where a distinction was made between ASD participants 
with alexithymia and ASD participants without alexithymia, the two control participants with 
alexithymia were excluded from the control group. 
Alexithymia scores showed a moderate negative correlation with MET affective 
empathy scores (r = -.46, p < .001), and a strong negative correlation with QCAE scores (r = 
-.58, p < .001). The two subscales of the QCAE (cognitive and affective empathy) both 
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correlated negatively with alexithymia: QCAE cognitive r = -.57, p < .001 and QCAE 
affective r = -.40, p = .003. See Table 1.  
 
ii. Empathy measures 
For the QCAE, there was a significant between-subjects effect of ASD status while 
controlling for alexithymia levels, F (1, 49) = 16.93, p < .001, indicating that ASD 
participants (M = 72.6, SD = 16.3) scored significantly lower on the total QCAE scores than 
control participants (M = 89.1, SD = 13.3). An interaction effect of ASD status and empathy 
type, F (1, 49) = 16.27, p = .008, indicated a different effect per empathy type depending on 
ASD status. On cognitive empathy, ASD participants scored significantly lower (M = 43.1, 
SD = 12.6) than the control participants (M = 58.0, SD = 5.8), t (50) = 4.35, p < .001, d = 
1.20, but the affective empathy scores did not significantly differ between groups (ASD M = 
29.5, SD = 5.8; controls M = 32.1, SD = 5.0), t (50) = 1.74, p = .09, d = 0.48. See Figure 1.	  	  	  
Figure 1. Scores on the empathy measures – the cognitive empathy subscale and the affective 
empathy subscale of the QCAE and scores on the MET affective empathy task – for control 
0"
10"
20"
30"
40"
50"
60"
70"
QCAE cognitive empathy QCAE affective empathy 
Q
C
A
E 
sc
or
es
 
non-ASD non-alexithymic 
ASD - non-alexithymic 
ASD - alexithymic 
0"
1"
2"
3"
4"
5"
6"
7"
MET affective empathy 
M
ET
 s
co
re
s 
*"
*"
*"
	   	   	   	   15	  	  
	  15	  	  
participants, ASD participants without alexithymia and ASD participants with alexithymia. 
Error bars denote standard error. Note * = p < .05 
 
A 2 x 3 mixed Anova showed a significant between-subjects effect, F (2, 47) = 16.77, 
p < .001, indicating differences between the control participants, ASD participants without 
alexithymia and ASD participants with alexithymia. An interaction effect of empathy x 
group, F (2, 47) = 12.34, p < .001, indicated that differences between groups were different 
for the two empathy types. ASD participants with alexithymia had significantly lower 
affective empathy on the QCAE (M = 26.9. SD = 5.7) compared to the control group (M = 
32.0, SD = 5.1), t (35) = 2.78, p = .009, d = 0.94, and lower affective empathy compared to 
ASD participants without alexithymia, t (24) = 2.48, p = .02, d = 0.97, approaching 
significance taking into account a Bonferroni corrected alpha-level of 0.017, although the 
effect size is large and non-significance may be attributed to the small sample size (n = 26). 
There was no difference in affective empathy between ASD participants without alexithymia 
(M = 32.1, SD = 4.8) and the control participants, t (35) = .02, p = .98, d = 0.01. On cognitive 
empathy, ASD participants with alexithymia scored significantly lower (M = 36.0, SD = 
10.97) than control participants (M = 57.5, SD = 10.4), t (35) = 5.90, p < .001, d = 2.00, and 
lower than ASD participants without alexithymia (M = 50.2, SD = 10.0), t (24) = 3.43, p = 
.002, d = 1.34. ASD participants without alexithymia scored lower on cognitive empathy than 
the control participants, t (35) = 2.09, p = .04, d = 0.71, approaching the Bonferroni-corrected 
significance level of .017. The effect size is medium to large.  
There were similar levels of affective empathy - as measured by the MET - in ASD 
participants and control participants (ASD M = 4.6, SD = 1.7; controls M = 5.0, SD = 1.8), 
t(50) = 0.84, p = .40, d = 0.23).  Using a one-way Anova accounting for the alexithymia 
status in the ASD group, a significant difference between groups, F (2, 47) = 4.05, p = .03, 
was found. ASD participants with alexithymia scored significantly lower than ASD 
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participants without alexithymia, (ASD M = 3.7, SD = 1.5) t (24) = 2.97, p = .007, d = 1.16, 
who scored similar to control participants without alexithymia, (ASD M = 5.5, SD = 1.5, 
controls M = 5.1, SD = 1.8), t (35) = 0.66, p = .51, d = 0.22, see Figure 1. 
 ASD participants were equally accurate at identifying an emotion displayed on the 
screen (M = 0.67, SD = 0.08) as the control participants (M = 0.67, SD = 0.1), t (50) = 0.12, p 
= .91, d = 0.03, in the MET emotion recognition task. Alexithymia status of the ASD 
participants did not alter these results, F (2, 47) = 0.17, p = .84, nor was there a correlation 
between MET emotion recognition and alexithymia for all participants, r (50) = .20, p = .15; 
and ASD participants separately, r (24) = .26, p = .20. Therefore we may assume that the 
differences seen between groups in the MET affective empathy task were not due to poorer 
emotion recognition due to alexithymia. 
 
iii. Interoception measures 
a. Interoceptive sensitivity  
Statistical checks (independent two-tailed t-tests) were made to ensure there were no 
significant differences in heart rate or Body Mass Index between ASD participants and 
control participants. Nor were there any significant correlations between heart rate and 
autistic traits, or BMI and performance on the IS tasks. Only on the heartbeat tracking task 
was there a trend towards participants with higher BMI to be less accurate at tracking, r (46) 
= -.24, p = .07.  
 There was no significant difference in the accuracy scores for the heartbeat 
discrimination task between ASD participants (M = 0.56, SD = 0.17) and control participants, 
(M = 0.62, SD =0.19), t (49) = 0.86, p = .39, d = 0.24. Taking into account the alexithymia 
status of ASD participants in a three level one-way Anova did not alter these results, F (2, 46) 
= 1.92, p = 0.16. However, ASD participants were less accurate (M = 0.63, SD = 0.19) than 
control participants (M = 0.74, SD = 0.15), t (42.8) = 2.10, p = 0.04, d = 0.58 on the heartbeat 
tracking task. See Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Interoceptive accuracy for control participants and ASD participants, measured by 
two heartbeat tasks. Error bars denote standard error. Note * = p < .0 
 
 A three level one-way Anova showed a significant difference between the groups of 
control participants, ASD participants without alexithymia and ASD participants with 
alexithymia, (F (2, 46) = 3.96, p = .03) on heartbeat tracking. Taking into account a 
Bonferroni-corrected alpha level of .017, the control group had a tendency (approaching 
significance) to score better than the non-alexithymic ASD group, t (16.3) = 2.69, p = .04, 
and the alexithymic ASD group t (35) = 2.08, p = .04. However, there was no significant 
difference between ASD participants with alexithymia (M = 0.66, SD = 0.13) and those 
without alexithymia (M = 0.59, SD = 0.23), t (19.2) = .07, p = 0.46) on the heartbeat tracking 
task.  
The scores of the heartbeat discrimination task and the heartbeat tracking task did not 
correlate, r (49) = 0.10, p = .49. A strong correlation between the two is often cited  (Knoll & 
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Hodapp, 1992), but is not always found in studies (e.g. Schulz, Lass-Hennemann, Sütterlin, 
Schächinger, & Vögele, 2013). Sometimes a strong correlation is found only in the best 
performing participants (Schaefer, Egloff, & Witthüft, 2012). Indeed, this was the case here. 
The performances in both heartbeat tasks correlated strongly only for those with good 
heartbeat discrimination scores (based on a median split), r (9) = .70, p = .02. There were no 
significant correlations between IS measures and empathy measures or alexithymia; see 
Table 1.  
 
b. Interoceptive awareness 
Multidimensional scaling analyses showed three clusters of MAIA dimensions could be 
identified and named, (normalised raw stress = 0.035):  
1. Awareness (noticing and meta-awareness of bodily sensations), which includes the MAIA 
dimensions of trusting, emotional awareness and noticing. 
2. Active and reactive strategies with regard to bodily sensations, which includes the 
dimensions of not-distracting, not-worrying, self-regulation and body listening 
3. Attention regulation, which is the ability to pay attention to the body in an environment of 
competing stimuli.  
ASD participants scored significantly lower on MAIA awareness, t (50) = 2.50, p = .02, d 
= 0.70, and MAIA active and reactive strategies, t (50) = 2.37, p = .02, d = 0.65, (awareness 
M = 8.01, SD = 2.83; active reactive strategies M = 8.15, SD = 2.31) than control participants 
(awareness M = 9.79, SD = 2.18; active and reactive strategies M = 9.64, SD = 2.22), but 
there was no significant difference on MAIA attention regulation, (ASD M = 2.46, SD = 
1.90; control M = 3.59, SD = 2.84) t (50) = 1.70, p = .10, d = 0.46, see Figure 3.  
A three level one-way Anova comparing means between control participants, ASD 
participants without alexithymia and ASD participants with alexithymia showed a significant 
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difference between groups on MAIA awareness, F (2,47) = 7.91, p = .001; on MAIA Active 
and Reactive Strategies, F (2, 47) = 9.58, p < .001; and a difference approaching significance 
on MAIA attention regulation, F (2, 47) = 3.12, p = .053. Participants with ASD and 
alexithymia scored significantly lower on MAIA awareness, M = 6.66, SD = 2.94, than ASD 
participants without alexithymia, M = 9.36, SD = 2.03, t (24) = 2.72, p = .01 and control 
participants, M = 9.85, SD = 2.22, t (35) =3.71, p = .001. Similarly, participants with ASD 
and alexithymia scored significantly lower on MAIA Active and Reactive Strategies, M = 
6.76, SD = 1.97, than ASD participants without alexithymia, M = 9.53, SD = 1.75, t (24) = 
3.81, p = .001 and control participants, M = 9.76, SD = 2.27, t (35) = 4.00, p < .001. On 
MAIA attention regulation ASD participants with alexithymia also had lower scores, M = 
1.64, SD = 0.71, than ASD participants without alexithymia, M = 3.27, SD = 2.36, and 
control participants, M = 3.68, SD = 2.94), approaching significance after a Bonferroni 
correction of the alpha level to .017, t (35) = 2.45, p = .019. There were no significant 
differences between control participants and ASD participants without alexithymia. 
After Bonferroni correction of the alpha level to p = .0014, MAIA awareness had strong 
negative correlations with autistic traits (AQ) and alexithymia (TAS20), strong positive 
correlations with QCAE total scores and QCAE cognitive empathy scores, and a moderate 
positive correlation with MET empathizing scores. There was a moderate negative 
correlation of MAIA active and reactive strategies with autistic traits and a strong negative 
correlation with alexithymia scores; see Table 1.  
In order to identify the relative magnitude of the relationship of alexithymia and autistic 
traits with IA, partial correlations were carried out. After Bonferroni correction of the alpha 
level to p = .025, these showed that the relationship between MAIA awareness and AQ was 
no longer significant after controlling for alexithymia, r = -0.28, p = .03, as was the 
relationship of MAIA active and reactive strategies and AQ, r = -0.10, p = .49. However, the 
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relationship between MAIA awareness and alexithymia was no longer significant either after 
controlling for AQ, r = -0.28, p = .05. On the other hand, the relationship between MAIA 
active and reactive strategies and alexithymia was still significant after controlling for AQ, r 
= -.38, p = .005. 
 
Table 1. 
Correlations between interoceptive measures and autistic traits, alexithymia and empathy 
measures. 
Measure AQ TAS20 MET accuracy 
MET 
empathizing 
QCAE 
total 
QCAE 
cognitive 
empathy 
QCAE 
affective 
empathy 
        
Heartbeat 
tracking 1 -0.04 0.14 0.04 -0.14 0.03 0.15 -0.17 
Heartbeat 
detection  -0.29* -0.10 -0.17 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.17 
MAIA 
awareness -0.57*** -0.57*** 0.01 0.45*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.33* 
MAIA 
active and 
reactive 
strategies 
-0.44*** -0.57*** -0.26 0.23 0.27* 0.33* 0.03 
 
MAIA 
attention 
regulation 
-0.34* -0.36** -0.09 -0.09 0.22 -0.31* 0.10 
1 Correlations were controlled for Body Mass Index 
Note: * p ≤.05. **p ≤ .01.  ** p***p < .001. 
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Figure 3. Interoceptive awareness measured by the three clusters of items of the MAIA 
questionnaire, for control participants and ASD participants. Error bars denote standard error. 
Note * = p < .05 
 
iv. Relationships between interoception, alexithymia and empathy  
No conditional process analyses or mediation analyses were conducted with IS as a 
predictor variable, due to the absence of significant correlations of IS with alexithymia and 
empathy. Mediation analysis using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) in SPSS was conducted with 
the three MAIA clusters entered as predictor variables (using a multiple regression approach), 
alexithymia as a mediator and total QCAE score as the dependent variable. The analysis 
showed that both MAIA awareness and MAIA active and reactive strategies contributed 
significantly to alexithymia, while MAIA attention regulation did not contribute to 
alexithymia after taking the other MAIA clusters into account (see the regression coeffients 
a1 , a2 , and a3 in Table 2).  
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Table 2.  
 
Coefficients of the direct and indirect path of the effect of self-reported interoceptive 
awareness (MAIA clusters) on self-reported empathy (QCAE) through alexithymia. 
 
 Consequent 
 M (TAS20) Y (QCAE)  
Antecedent 
Coefficient SE p Coefficient SE p 
ab 
(Confidence 
interval) 
Awareness a1 -2.42 0.69 .001 c’1 2.17 0.86 .015 
1.19  
(0.42 - 2.65) 
Active/Reactive 
Strategies 
a2 -2.88 0.83 .001 c’2 -0.72 1.03 .488 
1.411 
(0.53 -2.83) 
Attention 
regulation 
a3 0.16 0.78 .839 c’3 -.35 0.86 .684 
-0.08 
(-0.70 – 0.57) 
M (TAS20)     b -.49 0.16 .004 
 
Constant i1 99.72 7.75 < .001 i2 95.66 18.27 < .001 
        Total effects: 
R2 = 0.32 
F (3, 47) = 7.37,  
p < .001 
 R2 =.47 
F (3,47) = 14.09 
p < .001 
R2 = .43 
F (4, 46) =  8.80,  
p < .001 
 
 
Table 3.  
 
Coefficients of the direct and indirect path of the effect of self-reported interoceptive 
awareness (MAIA clusters) on behavioural affective empathy (MET) through alexithymia. 
 
 Consequent 
 M (TAS20) Y (MET)  
Antecedent 
Coefficient SE p Coefficient SE p 
ab 
(Confidence 
interval) 
Awareness a1 -2.42 0.69 .001 c’1 0.28 0.10 < .01 
0.09 
(0.02 – 0.24) 
Active/Reactive 
Strategies 
a2 -2.88 0.83 .001 c’2 0.08 0.12 .53 
0.121 
(0.02 -0.27) 
Attention 
regulation 
a3 0.16 0.78 .839 c’3 -.31 0.10 < .01 
-0.006 
(-0.07 – 0.05) 
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M (TAS20)     b -.04 0.02 .04 
 
Constant i1 99.72 7.75 < .001 i2 5.05 2.19 < .001 
        Total effects: 
R2 = 0.34 
F (3, 47) = 8.28,  
p < .001 
 R2 =0.474 
F (3,47) = 14.09 
p < .001 
R2 = 0.40 
F (4, 46) =  7.72,  
p < .001 
 
 
 
Alexithymia contributed significantly to QCAE scores (see regression coefficient b in 
Table 2). This indicates that participants with lower MAIA awareness demonstrated higher 
alexithymia levels (negative coefficients a1 and a2), and in turn participants with higher 
alexithymia levels tended to have lower QCAE (negative coefficient b). The indirect path 
(ab) of the effects of MAIA awareness and MAIA active and reactive strategies via 
alexithymia on QCAE scores was significant. The three MAIA clusters explained 32 percent 
of the variance in QCAE empathy scores. See Table 3 for the coefficients of the paths.  
The same analysis was conducted to look at the effects of the MAIA clusters on 
behavioural affective empathy scores (MET empathy) through alexithymia; see Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3] Similar to the effects of MAIA clusters on QCAE scores, this showed that the 
indirect effect of MAIA awareness through alexithymia to MET empathy was significant, as 
was the indirect effect of MAIA Active/Reactive strategies. The effect of MAIA attention 
regulation on MET empathy was not mediated through alexithymia after taking the other 
MAIA clusters into account. The three MAIA clusters explained 34 percent of the variance in 
MET empathy scores.  
  To determine whether the path from interoceptive awareness to understanding 
oneself to understanding others differed in participants with ASD, a conditional process 
analysis was carried out (Hayes, 2013). ASD status was introduced as a moderator of the 
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indirect path (see Figure 4), testing the hypothesis that the strength of the indirect effect of 
MAIA scores on empathy through alexithymia depends on whether one has ASD or not. Only 
the indirect effect of MAIA Active and reactive strategies on QCAE and MET empathy 
scores via alexithymia were moderated by ASD status (index of moderated mediation QCAE 
= 2.08, CI = 0.275 - 4.558; index of moderated mediation MET empathy = 0.177, CI = .028 - 
0.408). This means that the increase in alexithymia due to higher active and reactive 
strategies scores was significantly larger for ASD participants compared to control 
participants, (ΔR2 = .05, F (1, 47) = 4.03, p = .05). Therefore, the final model of the 
relationship between the clusters of the MAIA, ASD, alexithymia and empathy can be 
visualised as in Fig. 4. 
 Figure 4. Final mediation model of the relationships between interoceptive awareness (three 
MAIA clusters), alexithymia (mediator), and empathy. It shows how interoceptive awareness 
is related to empathy indirectly, via alexithymia, and how ASD status may act as a moderator 
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on the indirect relationship. Dotted lines indicate non-significance of an association after 
taking the other relationships into account with a multiple regression approach. 
 
Discussion 
The present study sought to investigate links between interoceptive processing, 
alexithymia and empathy in participants with ASD. The findings suggest that interoceptive 
processing is attenuated in ASD participants compared to control participants, since the 
former were less accurate at tracking their own heartbeat and showed lower self-reported 
interoceptive awareness. Contrary to expectations, interoceptive sensitivity (IS) was not 
related to alexithymia and empathy. However, interoceptive awareness (IA) was related to 
autistic traits, alexithymia and empathy. IA contributed to empathy levels indirectly, through 
inverse relationships with alexithymia, suggesting that the greater the awareness of one’s own 
bodily sensations (measured via the MAIA questionnaire), the better one may be able to 
identify and describe one’s own emotions (measured via TAS-20 score), the higher the 
empathy for others’ emotions. It appears then, that the subjective awareness and 
understanding of one’s bodily sensations and emotions is more important for empathy than is 
accuracy in detecting bodily sensations. These findings can be argued to support Bird & 
Viding’s SOME (2014), which proposes that cognitive representations of one’s own 
emotions are integral to empathy. The ability to accurately recognise another’s emotion, 
often regarded as a measure of cognitive empathy  (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; 
Demurie, De Corel, & Roeyers, 2011; Golan & Baron-Cohen, 2006), was not related to IS, 
IA or alexithymia in this sample.  
A difference in IS was shown between the groups in one of the two heartbeat 
perception tasks. On average, control participants were better at tracking their own heartbeat, 
but there was no difference between groups in the heartbeat discrimination task. The 
heartbeat discrimination task is thought to be less susceptible to confounds, such as prior 
	   	   	   	   26	  	  
	  26	  	  
knowledge about heart rate, but a disadvantage of this task is that most individuals (including 
current participants) perform close to chance level resulting in a lower variance in 
performance across a sample  (Knapp-Kline & Kline, 2005; Phillips, Jones, Rieger, & Snell, 
1999). The heartbeat discrimination task relies on a complex integration of stimuli from 
interoceptive (cardiac) and exteroceptive (auditory) modalities, and requires a temporal 
comparison of them to enable a judgment of synchronicity. In contrast, the heartbeat tracking 
task demands attention to only one (interoceptive) modality, and no synchronicity judgement 
is required. The different demands of these tasks on sensory processing and attention may 
contribute to the different results for the two tasks in the present study. A dissociation 
between performance on the two tasks has been found before, with different populations 
(Kandasamy et al., 2016; Schulz et al., 2013). Performance on the heartbeat tracking task has 
shown to be related to performance on a time estimation task (Meissner & Wittmann, 2011), 
suggesting that the ability to estimate time or sustain attention may influence heartbeat 
tracking accuracy. However, subsequent research with ASD participants did not replicate this 
relationship (Shah, Catmur & Bird, 2016; Shah, Hall, Catmur & Bird, 2016), nor did 
controlling for it alter the observed relationship between heartbeat tracking and alexithymia. 
We did not measure time estimation and could therefore not control for it, but based on the 
research of Shah and colleagues it appears that time estimation is not always a confounding 
variable.  
Only four studies to date have used heartbeat perception tasks to assess IS in ASD 
samples. Schauder et al. (2015) found that children with ASD were better at heartbeat 
tracking than controls, but only in their longest interval (100 secs), which was longer than the 
longest interval in the present study (55 secs). The authors suggest that the ability to sustain 
attention to interoceptive signals for longer durations may be better in children with ASD.  
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The second study - by Garfinkel et al. (2016) - found, in contrast, reduced IS 
(measured by the heartbeat tracking task) in 20 adults with ASD, compared to control 
participants. Our findings are in line with this study, and are also in in line with qualitative 
reports of sensitivity to interoceptive stimuli in individuals with ASD (Elwin et al., 2013). 
We note that Garfinkel et al. found enhanced IA (what they term ‘interoceptive sensibility’), 
whereas we found reduced IA. This is likely due to the very different self-report 
questionnaires used to measure IA: Garfinkel et al. used the Porges Body Perception 
Questionnaire (Porges, 1993). The items of the Porges questionnaire relate to an interoceptive 
awareness (or ‘sensibility’) that is more associated with anxiety, hypochondria and 
hypervigilance than are the items of the MAIA, for which more positive scores indicate a 
more ‘mindful’ attention style towards interoceptive cues, viewed as healthy and beneficial 
(Mehling, 2016). Given these important differences it is not a contradiction between the 
studies, and indeed, it could well be expected, given associations between ASD and anxiety  
(Skokauskas & Gallagher, 2010), that participants with ASD should score high on the Porges 
questionnaire, and low on the MAIA. 
The third recent study, by Shah et al. (2016b), found no difference in performance on 
the heartbeat tracking task between 19 adults with ASD and a control group. However, 
importantly, the two groups were matched for alexithymia, and the authors report that across 
two experiments IS was highly correlated with alexithymia, but not with autistic traits (AQ 
scores), leading to their conclusion that alexithymia, and not autism, is associated with 
reduced IS. This result was replicated in their other study (Shah, et al., 2016a). In contrast, 
while we did not find a correlation between alexithymia and IS, we did find correlations 
between alexithymia and interoceptive awareness. The difference with respect to IS may 
reflect differences in characteristics of the population samples: in the study by Shah et al. 
there was a greater number of participants with alexithymia than in our sample. Our null-
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result in the relationship between alexithymia and IS should be taken with some caution, 
because our control group and ASD group were not matched for alexithymia severity, and the 
variance in alexithymia of the ASD group and the control group was not equal. Despite this, 
we did not find a significant difference between ASD participants with alexithymia and those 
without alexithymia on the heartbeat tracking task. 
Our data show no correlation between IS and the empathy measures.  In contrast, 
Grynberg and Pollatos (2015) found that IS, measured by the heartbeat tracking task, was 
predictive of the level of self-reported arousal, compassion and estimated intensity of pain, in 
response to viewing pictures of others in painful and non-painful situations. As such, 
empathy was measured as empathy for pain only, which may elicit stronger feelings in the 
empathic observer than our stimuli. A recent study on healthy adults that measured heartbeat 
tracking and empathy (via the QCAE) also found no correlation between the two (Ainley, 
Maister, & Tsakiris, 2015). Garfinkel and colleagues found that a calculation of meta-
awareness of IS, by quantifying the discrepancy between IS and self-report IA, was related to 
scores on an empathy questionnaire (Garfinkel et al., 2016). 
In line with Fiene and Brownlow (2015), we found that self-reported interoceptive 
awareness (measured with the MAIA) was lower for ASD participants, in two of the three 
clusters (comprising 7 of the 8 subscales of the MAIA): the cluster that measured noticing 
and meta-awareness of bodily sensations, and the cluster that measured active and reactive 
strategies towards bodily sensations, which encompasses regulatory aspects of bodily feelings 
and the tendencies to not worry about bodily feelings. There was no difference between 
groups for MAIA attention regulation.  
When taking into account the alexithymia status of the participants, this showed that 
ASD participants with alexithymia had lower MAIA scores than those without alexithymia in 
two of the three MAIA clusters. This supports the recent findings by Shah and colleagues 
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(2016a; 2016b) that alexithymia and interoception are related, whereas interoception and 
autistic traits may not be. The partial correlations we performed to tease out the relative 
relationships of autistic traits and alexithymia with interoception confirmed this interpretation 
in the case of MAIA active and reactive strategies; after controlling for alexithymia, the 
relationship with autistic traits was no longer significant, while the relationship with 
alexithymia remained significant even after controlling for autistic traits. We could not 
confirm this for MAIA awareness however, where AQ remains significantly related to MAIA 
awareness after controlling for alexithymia, and vice versa. Whether this is due to our 
participant groups not being matched for alexithymia is hard to establish, but cannot be ruled 
out.  Having matched groups on alexithymia would allow for a better assessment of whether 
the effects of alexithymia shown in the ASD population are also seen in the typical 
population.  
 None of the MAIA clusters correlated significantly with the IS measures. This 
confirms the growing consensus that the conscious experience of bodily sensations does not 
necessarily reflect one’s sensitivity to them  (Cameron, 2001; Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, 
Suzuki, & Critchley, 2015). This corroborates previous studies (Garfinkel, et al., 2016; 
Khalsa et al., 2008). These studies, as well as the present one, therefore reinforce the notion 
that when investigating interoceptive processes, distinctions should be made between the 
physiological states of the body, the brain’s sensitivity to these states, metacognition of one’s 
sensitivity, and general ‘trait’ interoceptive awareness (Garfinkel et al., 2015).  
The finding that ASD participants have overall lower empathy levels than participants 
without ASD supports previous findings (e.g., Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Greimel 
et al., 2010). When cognitive and affective empathy were separately examined, only 
cognitive empathy was found to be lower in ASD participants; affective empathy was at the 
same level as found for control participants, as in other studies  (Blair, 2005; Dziobek et al., 
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2008; Rogers et al., 2007; Rueda et al., 2015). This result was corroborated by data from the 
affective empathy behavioural task: there was no difference between ASD participants and 
controls when they were asked how much they felt the same emotion as the people shown on 
the monitor. This shows that the description of ASD as an empathy disorder (Gillberg, 1992) 
is not entirely correct, and difficulties in emotional and social functioning are more likely to 
reflect a deficit in the cognitive domain rather than the affective domain (Bachevalier & 
Loveland, 2006). 
However, our results that ASD participants were no worse than control participants on 
the MET emotion recognition task is not in line with previous research employing this task 
(Dziobek et al., 2008), and other emotion recognition tasks. Examining the results more 
closely, this appears to be due to our control participants underperforming, rather than our 
ASD participants performing better than in Dziobek’s study. This may be due to ceiling 
effects being lower in the English version compared to the German version, the inclusion of a 
few non-native English speakers, or simply because of our particular sample of participants. 
Previous research has suggested that inconsistent findings with regard to empathy 
levels in participants with ASD might be explained by variations in alexithymia levels among 
participants (Bird et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2013; Silani et al., 2008). Confirming this, we 
found that both cognitive and affective empathy levels of the ASD participants with co-
occurring alexithymia were lower than those of control participants, whereas in ASD 
participants without alexithymia only cognitive empathy was affected; they had similar levels 
of affective empathy to control participants, on both behavioural and self-reported measures.  
Given the high prevalence of alexithymia amongst ASD participants (here 50% - in line with 
earlier findings, e.g. Hill et al., 2004), there may be large subset of individuals with ASD 
whose experience of emotions (their own and those of others) is qualitatively different from 
other individuals with ASD. Furthermore, our results suggest that these individuals may have 
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reduced access to associative learning mechanisms between interoceptive signals, their 
emotions, and others’ emotions (Bird & Viding, 2014; Murphy, Brewer, Catmur & Bird, 
2017; Quatrocki & Friston, 2014), which means interoceptive training to accompany social 
and/or emotional learning for these individuals could be helpful (Livingston & Livingston, 
201; Shah, 2016). This may be a valuable insight for anyone who deals with people with 
ASD, from parents to teachers to therapists, and is a topic that clearly warrants further 
research.  
Conditional process analyses showed that alexithymia played a mediating role 
between IA and empathy, and that this relationship was partly moderated by autistic status. 
The indirect path, i.e. the association of IA with empathy via alexithymia, explained around a 
third of the variance in empathy scores. Specifically, lower scores on the MAIA clusters of 
awareness, and active and reactive strategies, were both associated with higher alexithymia 
(TAS-20) scores. Higher levels of alexithymia were in turn related to lower levels of 
empathy, in keeping with earlier findings  (Grynberg et al., 2010; Guttman & Laporte, 2002).  
ASD status did not moderate the relationship between the cluster of ‘awareness’ and 
alexithymia, but it did moderate the relationship between the cluster of ‘active and reactive 
strategies’ and alexithymia:  If a participant had ASD, the relationship between ‘active and 
reactive strategies’ and alexithymia was significantly stronger than if a participant did not 
have ASD. This may mean that the attitudinal and regulatory dimensions of IA may be more 
consequential for individuals with ASD than for individuals without ASD. Resulting higher 
levels of alexithymia and lower levels of empathy may be related to more difficulties in 
social functioning and emotion regulation (Garfinkel, et al., 2016), and may affect other 
aspects of self-referenced cognition (Cameron, 2001; Northoff et al., 2006) and mental health 
(Khalsa & Lapidus, 2016; Murphy et al., 2017). For example, excessive focus on bodily 
sensations and a numbing of bodily sensations have been related to maladaptive self-
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referenced processing contributing to anxiety and depression respectively  (Dunn et al., 2010; 
Paulus & Stein, 2010). Both disorders are also associated with altered alexithymia levels  
(Marchesi, Brusamonti, & Maggini, 2000; Paulus & Stein, 2010) and are common co-
occurring conditions of ASD  (Skokauskas & Gallagher, 2010).  
However, some caution must be exercised with this possible interpretation for two 
reasons. The difference in the mediating effect of alexithymia between our ASD participants 
and control participants may be caused by the lack of variance in alexithymia in the control 
group; the number of control participants with high alexithymia levels did not match the 
number of ASD participants with high alexithymia. The observed moderation effect also 
seems to be in contradiction to result of the partial correlations that show that the relationship 
between MAIA active and reactive strategies and alexithymia to be robust when controlling 
for autistic traits, while the relationship between autistic traits and MAIA active and reactive 
strategies became non-significant when controlling for alexithymia. Similarly, two recent 
studies in which alexithymia levels between groups was matched, found that severity of 
autistic traits was not related to IS, whereas alexithymia was related to IS (Shah et al., 2016a; 
Shah et al., 2016b). Secondly, five of the ASD participants reported co-occurring mood 
disorders (depression or anxiety), three of which had high alexithymia. We can’t exclude this 
as a second possible explanation for the different effect in the ASD group, as we did not 
measure levels of anxiety or depression. An inability to control for levels of anxiety or 
depression is a limitation of the present study. 
In conclusion, this study has found evidence for the role of interoceptive awareness in 
empathy, such that higher interoceptive awareness was related to higher levels of both 
cognitive and affective empathy. This relationship was mediated by alexithymia, which had 
an inverse relationship with both interoceptive awareness and empathy. Based on our results 
it appears that mere sensitivity to one’s heartbeat does not, or is not sufficient, to explain 
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individual differences in the understanding of one’s own emotions or differences in empathy. 
Our study suggests that cognitive processes contributing to the subjective experience of 
bodily feelings are needed to provide that link, which is supportive of Bird and Viding’s 
SOME and the role of its ‘affective representation system’ (Bird & Viding, 2014). 
We found that participants with high functioning ASD had lower interoceptive 
sensitivity and lower interoceptive awareness than participants without ASD. However, it has 
proved difficult to unequivocally establish whether the relationship between interoceptive 
awareness and alexithymia is unique to autism or also occurs in the typical population, 
because our control sample lacked individuals with high alexithymia. Despite this, this 
research contributes to the growing evidence that within the ASD population there is a large 
subgroup of individuals with high levels of alexithymia (Hill et al., 2004) and low levels of 
interoceptive awareness (Shah et al., 2016a; Shah et al., 2016b). These individuals have 
lower levels of cognitive and affective empathy than the typical population and individuals 
with ASD without alexithymia. Further research is needed to investigate whether being 
alexithymic as well as autistic could have an additional impact on other aspects of social 
functioning, emotion regulation, and mental health problems such as anxiety and depression. 
The present and related recent findings may therefore impact on ASD diagnosis since they 
show the potential importance of distinguishing between symptoms and characteristics that 
are linked to ASD and those that are linked to alexithymia. Finally, a focus on interoceptive 
training and in particular, promoting a beneficial (mindful) attentional style towards bodily 
sensations may be fruitful avenues for future therapeutic approaches. 
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